SA-26-385 Low

Jupyter: JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for…

Jupyter

Severity
Low, no CVSS score published
Record
GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j
Affects
Jupyter
Known exploited
Not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Published
Record first published by the source
July 22, 2026
Source last modified
July 22, 2026

Description

The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside PyPIExtensionManager.install() was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: install() was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.

This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: - a custom extension or downstream integration that imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling install()); - an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install; - the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and - kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's install() call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)

Impact

Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public install() method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.

Patches

JupyterLab [v4.6.2](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2) and [v4.5.10](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10) contain the patch.

Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.

Workarounds

No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:

--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly

or the following traitlet:

c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'

You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:

<img width="293" height="293" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f" />

Description quoted from the GitHub Advisory Database.

Sources

MORE ADVISORIES

See all